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Abstract 
This paper explains the circumstances that led Dubai to the 
current financial crisis that still lingers. It analyses the steps 
taken at various stages by the city state to ameliorate the 
situation including the bailout help the UAE Government 
eventually granted. It spotlights the role international rating 
agencies played in aggravating the situation and demands 
that their activities be brought under regulatory nets now 
being strengthened across the world in the context of 
ongoing global meltdown. Finally, it warns of challenges 
Dubai may he facing in years ahead and what could be done 
to pre-empt them. The argument is cast with a backdrop of 
the economic position of UAE in the Middle-East and 
happenings at the global level in the arena of finance - 
mainstream and Islamic. 
Kev orris: Islamic finance; Global meltdown, Dubai crisis; 
Rating agencies; financial architecture. 
Introduction 
The financial crisis that originated from the property sector of the US 
economy took little time to cover the financial firmament across countries. 
The global melt down as it is now called pales even the Great Depression of 
Prof. Dr. Zubair Ilasan, INCEIF: The Global University in Islamic Finance, 
Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) achieved ID13 prize in Islamic Economics (2009) 
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1930s in terms of its range, depth. damage caused and complexity. Its rise 
and ebb have been unique. It seems to he on a path of recurring revival 
threatening in some cases the collapse of an entire economy as of Greece. 
In earlier crises like that of 1930s, the standard remedy was attempting 
the revival of effective demand by putting money into the hands of people 
through initiating public works easing the unemployment situation: banks 
collapsed like card houses. Today the story is different. Banks have become 
too big to fail. huge sums from taxpayers' money are being spent as oxygen 
to keep there alive. Thus, the slogan of capitalism becomes: profits crrc" 
private, losses public. The expenditure on bailouts does little to expand 
effective demand. Unemployment continues to rise. Distributional 
inequalities tend to aggravate. 
Islamic finance has recently won much praise from the hankers, 
experts, scholars and jurists for remaining resilient and stable during the 
current global crisis. Indeed, they all claim that the crisis has helped prove 
the vitality of the Islamic system compared with its mainstream counterpart. 
They ignore the relative position of the two systems. Islamic finance is no 
more than a candle facing the sun: the ratio of market assets held by the two 
is no less than 1: 100, and is presently on the rise. Furthermore, Islamic 
finance stays risk averse. short-term and liquidity oriented. For these and 
other reasons the system has not yet developed enough pipelines to connect 
with the ongoing crisis. Nonetheless, some Islamic banks did come to grief in 
recent months. Examples are Investment Dar in Kuwait, Islamic Bank in 
Qatar, Gulf Finance House in Bahrain, the Emirate Islamic Bank of' IJAE and 
Dubai World. 
The U. A. E. has a unique political structure that gives much economic 
independence to the individual emirates. An understanding of the set up may 
help to appreciate the treatment of the Dubai crisis and what followed 
thereafter. 
2. Dubai in U. A. E. politico-economic structure 
The U. A. E. came into existence in 1971 after the United Kingdom 
announced the ending of its treaty relationship with the seven Crucial Coastal 
States that were under its protection since 1892. Abu Dhabi. Dubai and 
Sharjah are the three largest constituents of the country. Each one of its 
emirates is governed by an Emir who controls 
its administration. Each Emir 
manages independently the resources of' his unit. 
The Federal Supreme 
Council (FSC) consisting of these Emirs is the highest constitutional 
authority in the United Arab Emirates; it holds 
both the executive and 
legislature powers. 
1. For details sec Rashid Siddiqui (2010): Cross-sell of Islaniir finance, Islrrnric" 
Finance Report 2009, Project Finance International of Reuters. -I"agi Usmani 
also supports this view 
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The Emir of Abu Dhabi, the largest oil (petroleum) producing Emirate, 
was elected President of the U. A. E., and the Emir of Dubai, a commercial 
centre and a m; ijor oil producer was appointed as the Vice-president and 
Prime Minister. The legislative authority called the Federal National Council 
(FNC) plays only an advisory role. Its members are appointed by the FS(' to 
serve for a term of two years. 
A notable feature of the Middle-East countries is that they are mostly 
run by personal decision-making processes. The development of modern 
democratic institutions with sufficient autonomy have been slow to develop'. 
This is why sufficiently detailed, regular and reliable data on many vital 
national variables for these economies is often missing. Their economic 
policies thus defy worthwhile analyses. The U A. E. is in a better position: 
Available data is adequate to show that its vast natural resources in oil and 
gas next only to Saudi Arabia and Iraq. abundant supply of cheap skilled and 
unskilled labor from abroad, business friendly environment and socio- 
political stability have contributed handsomely to its economic growth and 
prosperity. 
UAE has been among the fastest growing economics in the world. Its 
GDP crossed $270 billion mark in early 2(X)9 even as subsequently recession 
in construction slowed growth and the economy is not estimated to expand 
more than 2'i(, in the year 2010. The size of the economy is third in the 
Middle-East and its per capita income rank is fourth in the world higher than 
several leading West European economies. The services sector at 44'I is the 
leading contributor to her revenues. 
Table 1: GDP indicators for the U. A. E. Economy 2004 - 2(08 
Years 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
GDI' (constant prices, 9.7 8.2 9.4 7.7c 6.6c 
annual `I change) 
GDP per capita (USD) 27.594.83 32.391.58 38,613.42 42,274.57c 45.228.31e 
Inflation rate (`h) 5.0 6.2 9.3 8.0e 6.4c 
Current Account 10.34 24.32 35.94 42.78e 49.5le 
(billions USD) 
Current Account (in 10.0 18.3 22.0 22.6c 23.06 
of GDP) 
Source. IýIF " World Economic Outlook 
Database 
Now (e) Estimated data 
2 For, example the participation of citizens in the political activities is non- 
existent in the U. A. F. Ever since the creation of the federation in 1971, the 
FCS has not made any changes in its principle of power delegation within the 
federal government. 
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The U. A. E. is a highly urbanized country. And. Dubai is the biggest 
city followed by Abu Dhabi which is the largest contributor to the U. A. E. 
revenue. The GDP of Dubai rose from $46 billion to S82 billion in 2008 
averaging 18, i growth a year. The economy was initially raised on petrol- 
dollars, but the fast dwindling oil reserves of the emirate made her take to 
diversifying the economy. The emirate decided to develop service and 
tourism sectors: it positioned itself as an international finance, trading and 
sports centre. Iugh rise buildings. grand hotels, and luxury resorts soon 
dotted the land all around. Property prices were on gallop until the close of' 
2008 when the tide of global crisis hit this tiny outpost. Interestingly, 
researchers find no significant relationship between the monetary and real 
sector growth rates in the U. A. E3. It was the fast dwindling demand for 
luxury houses and tourism services that crashed the economy. Banks cattle to 
grief as a result of recession in construction industries not because of 
financial overdoing.. U. A. E. is comparatively a modern westernized country 
in the region For example, alcohol is freely available and ladies are not 
obliged to cover their head. 
3. The debacle 
The debacle started with the booming real estate industry of Dubai 
going bust around the middle of 2008. Exuberance in a promising market had 
created excess supply. Property prices crashed - the average fall being 
around 4Wi' of their value in 2009 alone. Sales were slowing, profit margins 
were vanishing. The abrupt declaration on November 26 by Dubai 
government asking the creditors to reschedule repayment put the financial 
world in panic. Shares went tumbling across the world. 
Government of Abu Dhabi and the Central Bank of U. A. E. stepped in 
the nick of time with a $10 billion bailout offer for the state run Dubai World 
which had got stuck in a mire of billions of dollar debt. Of the allocated 
amount, S4.1 billion was meant to take care of the World's immediate debt 
obligations comprising Islamic bonds (sukuk) of Nakheel - the property 
development arm of the company. The amount was falling due on December 
14,2009; the very day support was pledged. Nakheel has since met its 
obligation within the stipulated time limit. The remaining S5.9 billion of the 
pledge was earmarked to help meet the obligations to trade creditors and 
contractors of the World. Contrary to what some perceived, it was not an 
unexpected step; many, including the IMF, could see it coming and hailed 
the UAE move to address the crisis. For failure to help could presumably 
threaten the cohesion of the IJAE. 
3 See Mohamed Shihab (2000): Economic Development in the UA E. I'I'. 249- 
259 posted on the internct 
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Dubai World had rather abruptly asked for time from its creditors until 
end of May 2010 to repay their loans of about $59 billion. The 
announcement caused a quiver in the global financial markets. The element 
of suddenness resulted in a failure of reaction to distinguish delay from 
default. The bailout announcement calmed the nerves reassuring investors. 
financial and trade creditors. employees, and common people that the 
government will always act to uphold the market principles and globally 
acceptable business practices. Stock markets in no time turned their tails up. 
US dollar looked up against the Yen; the Euro climbed them both. Asian 
credit default swaps tightened and the risk appetite got boosted. 
The reaction was sharper in the West as boom in the emirate was 
heavily financed by foreign funds, especially the European banks like IZI3S 
and Standard Chartered. Developing countries did not express much concern. 
India though feared the unemployment of her workers the crisis could cause, 
but the overall feel there was that a mountain was being made out of 
molehill. The Finance Minister of the country pointed out that in the first 
place the JRupeeI amount involved was small and in the second, the exposure 
of the Indian banking system to Dubai was limited. The statement largely 
reflected the sentiment in the Asian countries. 
In any case, the USS 10 billion bailout only provided some breathing 
space to Dubai World; its long run debt position remained precarious. It was 
only a couple of days back - May 20,2010 - that the company reached a 
deal in principle to restructure USS 23.5 billion in debt with the core lenders 
holding 60'7(; of the exposure. The proposal offers repayment over a five or 
eight year period and allows lenders to take on additional options. The deal 
has no new financial support from the government and must still be approved 
by banks outside the core negotiating panel. Naturally, this is not an entirely 
welcome position for Dubai World but under the circumstances they could 
not probably hope for the better. 
4. Sukuk under scanner 
As indicated above, the involvement of Sukuk - the Islamic bonds - in 
the fiasco was tiny. Still, most comments, including some from the sober 
academics, contained disproportionate voicing of alarm and warnings on the 
role of the Islamic bonds in Dubai turmoil. One reason why sukuk attracted 
the attention of the market probably was that it was the sukuk payment due 
on December 14 that was the centre of the tine-resetting negotiations: 
Islamic bonds so to say triggered the crisis. The government announcement 
of its intention to enforce payment rescheduling immediately led the 
Sec news item Dubai World in US $23.5 billion debt deal with lenders The 
New Straits Times, Friday. My 21.2010. page [38. 
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Moody's Investors and S&P rating agencies heavily downgrade the Islamic 
sukuk along with bonds of various government related entities in Dubai. A 
more realistic approach could not have missed the point that the amount due 
on sukuk was no more than 6 -7S; of the total money involved and failure 
had not yet taken place. Dubai suspended the operation of the agencies in the 
Emirate as a response. Rating agencies could have presumably shown a little 
restraint in their declarations. They wield enormous power in the global bond 
markets: they can literally make or unmake a government not by actual 
downgrading but by merely announcing the intention to do so. There are 
increasing murmurs in financial circles as to why these agencies are allowed 
to continue rating debt issues? As the bond issuers themselves have to pay 
for the evaluation exercise - and the payments are heavy - there candidly is 
scope for the ratings moving in tandem with the payments. It is not very clear 
what rules of conduct these agencies follow, who designs these rules and 
who oversees their observance: There is presumably a case for setting up 
regulatory frameworks for the rating agencies, even for establishing separate 
ones for Islamic bonds. 
A reference to Sukuk remaining under scanner during recent years may 
not be irrelevant in the present context. The controversy around the 
instrument continues to rage ever since Tagi Usmani. one of the leading 
jurists of today, caste cloud about its being Shari'ah compliant in most cases 
(85%). One consequence was that experts tend to sermon in whatever adversity 
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Figure 1: Growth of sukuk over the period 2000 - 2009. Source: \VFIF 
Foundation: 
Special Commemorative Publication 2010 
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they find the presence of sukuk. Dubai crisis has been no exception. The 
suspicion detracted from the rising popularity of the instrument as Figure 1 S 
above shows 
Some analysts looked at the Dubai turmoil from a historical angle. To 
them, the seeds of Dubai turmoil were so%%n the moment Sheikh Mohammad 
took the decision to invest his wealth as also of the emirate in the US real 
estate markets through the forci, -, n arm of 
Emaar - the second lar('est 
property developer on the scene. The company ultimately went bankrupt 
extending in the process the US suhprime crisis to the emirate. The American 
connection links well with Washington and Abu Dhabi putting pressure on 
Dubai to join the 'international community' in taking a tougher line on Iran, 
one of* main trade partners of the emirate. Dubai has also decided to enact 
immediately an insolvency law on the US-British model to provide 
protection to local companies like the World from its creditors. Abu Dhabi 
may also he looking for some concessions from the emirate in return for 
providing her the bailout. It may. for instance, seek concessions on trade with 
Iran and on the future of Emirates Airline. Here is in operation economics to 
meet political ends or precisely, the political economy of the region. 
Sukuk %%as not t/ur' issue in Dubai crisis as some have tried to make out. 
Sukuk market remained calm and unaffected by the turmoil across countries 
including the leading one in Malaysia. The emirate was in Part a victim of 
global meltdoww n and was in part overtaken by unguarded optimism and 
mismanagement. The crisis has compromised her reputation as an economic 
power house in the region it may find difficult to retrieve. It also faces the 
daunting task of restructuring the remaining S22 billion of Dubai World's 
debts. More importantly, what is going to be the fate of its huge investments 
sunk in high value property mostly in anticipation of foreign demand, 
especially from the Western rich countries. This demand may not be picking 
up for quite sometime. The future is quite uncertain, if not bleak. The emirate 
must proceed with caution. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The U. A. E. has been remarkably stable on the politico-economic front 
from its very inception. The overall gro\\th rate has been high though 
fluctuated with the rise and fall in international oil prices. The U. A. E. is one 
of the richest economics in the world. It has fine infrastructure and has spent 
lavishly to promote human development, especially through education and 
The vies' that Shari'ah run, l, atihility cif sukuk remains ccontnnersial wati 
endorsed also at the recentl: concluded 111: 11 ('unference in Kuala Lumpur. 
See their special run:., : ni orative publication 2010 entitled Eusunu, c 
. urstuiuuhility 
ill the; l1 it uoilcl: Empowc ini' people, lcocru: ini' resources. 
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health care. The global crisis essentially had impact on Dubai segment of the 
economy and the Emirate has eventually been able to tide over the situation 
even as her worries have not yet entirely ended". Presumably, there are a few 
generic lessons that the developing Muslim countries may learn from the 
recent happenings in Dubai. 
1. Consumption expenditure per head in U. A. E is very high even if 
allowance were made for high incomes. Semi-official reports indicate 
that daily per capita consumer spending in the UAE stands at 27 dollars 
while average spending in the rest of Arab countries is 3.5 dollars per 
day. Note also that personal loans grew by I I(;; during the last three 
months of 2(X)9. The phenomenon is set to expand even more, 
especially in view of existence of parties that are ready to fuel these 
unnecessarily lavish spending trends. This cuts into the investible 
savings and fuels inflation that touched 10`I last year. Like most Arab 
nations, there is no income tax in the U. A. E. However, there seems to 
be a case for considering the feasibility of levying an expenditure tax in 
the Emirate. It can have a simple structure, with suitable exemptions. It 
will curb isru/' (wasteful expenditure) and release larger funds for 
economic development'. 
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Source: Ministry of Planning and Economy Abu Dhabi 
Nakheel is facing cancellation of contracts even after the recent debt 
restructuring deal. IFIS: Weekly News letter. May 24.2010. 
It is suitable for Gulf countries because their populations arc small and 
economics are not very complex yet. 
54 Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance July- Sc1)(cntbcr :. '(11() 
2. Most of the consumption goods (S5`; ) are imported from the Western 
countries involving huge outflow of Homey (See Figure 2). There is a 
strong case for increasing trade among Muslim nations. Th,. efforts of 
WII: F seem to be bearing fruit: the intra-nation trade has gone up 
recently from uv;; to 20'li of the total. This can be pushed up 
substantially only through promoting mutual investment in producing 
substitute goods. A blue print for that can be prepared. 
3. Finally, Islamic financial institutions need diversification to move from 
the present short-term commercial financing towards long-term 
investment facilities. In this connection the air of doubts and 
controversy around sukuk must be cleared. It is gratifying to note that 
the IFSI3 is organizing a one day Seminar on Sukuk Development next 
month (June 20l0) in London just to address this issue. 
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